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Abstract While previous studies on mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) mostly relied on large firms, our
study is based on a sample that includes all Swiss
M&As that took place in the period 2006–2008, mostly
of which have been SMEs. We investigate the firm
characteristics that determine the innovation and
economic performance of M&As. The performance
measures are based on firms’ assessments. These
measures are regressed on a series of possible deter-
mining factors as postulated in existing theoretical and
empirical literature. M&A performance is primarily
affected by specific M&A characteristics, but not by
general market characteristics such as demand devel-
opment or competition conditions. Rather astonish-
ingly, it is also not affected by firm characteristics such
as capital intensity, human capital endowment and firm
size. There is an interesting exception: innovation
activities. This means that, with the remarkable
exception of innovation activities, the level of M&A
performance is determined primarily by factors of the
M&A process itself.
Keywords Mergers and acquisitions  Economic
performance  Innovation performance  Micro-data
JEL classifications L20  O31  L26
1 Introduction
There is a broad theoretical and empirical literature on
the economic performance of mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) (see, e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe 2000;
Kaplan 2000; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Gu-
gler et al. 2012). Nevertheless, some aspects remain
under-researched, particularly those that are specific to
small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). This neglect of
M&A studies that refer to SMEs may be traced back,
firstly, to the fact that the majority of empirical studies
rely on stock market-based measures of performance
(see Bild 1998; King et al. 2004; McDonald et al.
2008; Meglio and Risberg 2011). As such information
is not available for the majority of SMEs, the
performance of M&As is almost exclusively analyzed
for large M&As, and it is unclear whether the
implications of these studies are also valid for
M&As of SMEs (see Weitzel and McCarthy 2011).
Secondly, most previous empirical studies concentrate
on the effects of M&As on various aspects of
economic performance and rather neglect the inves-
tigation of the factors that influence such performance
effects. What is needed is more analysis of the factors
that determine the performance effects of M&As.
King et al. (2004), based on a meta-analysis of M&A
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studies, concluded that ‘‘what is clearly needed is a
better understanding of the conditions under which
acquisitions make sense as a path to superior perfor-
mance’’ (p. 196).
A further point is that only a limited number of
M&A studies focus on the consequences of M&A on
the firms’ technological activities (see Veugelers 2005
for a review of this literature). Given the increasing
importance of innovation activities as a driver of
growth, not only for larger firms but also for SMEs, it
becomes clear that more insights with respect to the
innovation effects of M&A are needed (see, e.g.,
Cassiman et al. 2005; Cloodt et al. 2006).
Our study is based on a representative sample
includung all Swiss M&As that took place in the
period 2006–2008. Average size of these firms is about
320 employees, with only 40 % of the firms having
more than 100 employees. Accordingly, we are able to
draw conclusions regarding the total of M&As in the
respective period of time, 86 % of which had less than
500 employees. Further, our study is based on survey
data that provide us with detailed information on the
determinants of M&A performance. We investigate
the firm characteristics that determine the innovation
and economic performance of M&A. The perfor-
mance measures come from survey-based firms’
assessments. These measures are regressed on a series
of possible determining factors as postulated in
existing theoretical and empirical literature.
Previous empirical studies that deal with the
determinants of M&A performance are often based
on small sample survey results. Probably most closely
related to our work are the studies of Capron (1999)
and Cassiman et al. (2005). However, neither study is
representative of the M&A population. Furthermore,
we analyze the determinants in a more general way.
While Capron (1999) focuses on performance effects
of asset divestiture and resource redeployment, we
have broader information to describe the determinants
of M&A performance. Cassiman et al. (2005) exclu-
sively analyzes the impact on the R&D process. Our
contribution to empirical literature is that we investi-
gate the determinants of the effects of M&A on both
economic and innovation performance based on a
sample of (mostly) SMEs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the conceptual background and the research
hypotheses that are tested in the empirical part.
Section 3 provides a short descriptive analysis of the
data used in the paper. In Sect. 4, the specification of
the empirical models is presented. Section 5 deals
with the estimation results and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual background and hypotheses
The literature referring to the explanation of the
performance of M&As can be divided in two
broad branches: the value-increasing efficient-market
approach and the value-decreasing agency approach.
According to the former, mergers occur because of the
possibility of exploiting synergies (between the acquir-
ing firm and the target firm), which in turn enhance the
performance of the merged firm (see, e.g., Hitt et al.
2001). The latter explains the performance failure of
mergers through the existence of informational and
agency problems between management and owners
(see, e.g., Jensen 1986). For SMEs, we expect that the
value-destroying approach will not apply because in
most cases there is no separation of ownership and
control (Weitzel and McCarthy 2011). In this study, we
thus concentrate on the value-increasing efficient-
market approach.
The most common theory explaining the possible
determinants of M&A performance suggests that firms
acquire other firms with some form of relatedness,
thereby creating efficiency through synergy (see
Harrison et al. 1991, p. 173). Synergy occurs when
the combination of two firms involved in a merger or
acquisition increases operating efficiency (i.e., it leads
to lower cost) and/or effectiveness (i.e., serves a more
appropriate allocation of scarce resources, given
environmental constraints) (Lubatkin 1983). Reasons
for such synergies are economies of scale and/or
economies of scope. While economies of scale reduce
average cost of production through size, economies of
scope are complementarities that make it cheaper to
produce goods jointly rather than to produce each of
them on its own, for example, by spreading advertising
costs across more business units (see, e.g., Seth 1990;
Sharma and Ho 2002).
M&A are multifaceted phenomena. Accordingly,
many sources of synergies have been suggested to
affect M&A performance in the M&A literature. In
accordance with this literature, we formulate a model
that considers several dimensions of M&A character-
istics (see King et al. 2004; Stahl and Voigt 2004;
Dutta and Jog 2009 for a survey of literature about the
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determinants of M&A performance). The results from
model estimation (see Sect. 5) will be interpreted in
the light of the hypotheses to be formulated in this
section.
2.1 Relative size
The performance of M&As should be related to the
relative size of the target firm to bidder. A larger
relative size correlates with a larger synergy potential
generated, for example, by economies of scale (see
Agrawal et al. 1992; Capron 1999). This should hold
for research as well as production facilities (Laabs and
Schiereck 2010). Furthermore, it is expected that
managerial attention is positively correlated with the
relative size of the target firm, which in turn may
increase the efficiency of synergy realization (see
Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). On the other hand, firm
size may also increase managerial difficulties (see
Dutta and Jog 2009). However, we presume that, on
balance, the positive effect of relative firm size weighs
more.
H1: The relative size of target firm is positively
correlated with the innovation performance as well as
economic performance of M&As.
2.2 Degree of integration
Economies of scale and scope through M&A usually
arise through asset divestiture (see Capron 1999;
Capron et al. 2001). The integration of the target firm
provides opportunities for sharing under-utilized
assets and for divesting less efficient product lines.
Furthermore, the integration of the target firm can
enhance innovation performance as it allows focusing
on the superior innovation capability (see Bertrand
and Zuniga 2006). Such synergistic benefits require, of
course, high levels of integration (see Datta 1991).
H2: The higher the degree of integration of the
target firm, the higher is the M&A performance
(innovation and economic performance).
2.3 Relatedness
Unrelated M&As are less likely to succeed because
managers of the acquiring firm are not familiar with
the target industry (see Agrawal et al. 1992; Sharma
and Ho 2002; Dutta and Jog 2009). Benefits from
economies of scope and scale are expected to be higher
in M&As, in which a relationship exists between the
acquiring and the target firm (operating in related
industries with similar or complementary products;
technological proximity) (see Singh and Montgomery
1987). In accordance with Cassiman et al. (2005), we
distinguish two types of relatedness: market-related-
ness that refers to the proximity as to the product
markets in which firms are operating, and technology-
relatedness that is associated with the proximity of the
firms’ knowledge endowment.
We expect both market-relatedness and technology-
relatedness to be positively correlated with economic
performance of M&As. The impact on innovation
performance has to be analyzed in a more differentiated
way (see Cassiman et al. 2005). Because of economies
of scope, technology-relatedness due to complementary
technologies would positively affect innovation perfor-
mance. When merged firms are technologically substi-
tutive (because of similar technologies), it is expected
that, e.g., R&D expenditures (in the sum) would
decrease. This is due to the elimination of common
inputs and lack of (or only small) efficiency gains of the
common R&D organization.
The expected main effect of market-relatedness is
to realize economies of scale, both through special-
ization and elimination of duplication. Innovation is
not the main motivation for such activities and may
thus be negatively affected (see Cassiman et al. 2005).
H3: Both the degree of market-relatedness and the
degree of technology-relatedness are positively cor-
related with the economic performance of M&As.
H4a: The degree of market-relatedness is negatively
correlated with innovation performance of M&As.
H4b: Complementary (substitutive) technology-
relatedness is positively (negatively) correlated with
innovation performance.
2.4 External versus internal acquisition
If the firms belonged to the same group of companies
before the transaction took place, it can be expected
that the group would have already taken advantage of
potential synergies between the firms. Accordingly, the
potential for additional synergies would be small in
case of internal acquisitions. On the other hand, the
problem of cultural differences is of minor relevance in
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case of internal acquisitions. Cultural differences, for
example, with respect to work-related values and
management style are likely to lead to employee
resistance and major integration problems in external
acquisitions. Accordingly, it is expected that cultural
differences would have a negative effect on M&A
performance (see Cartwright and Cooper 1996; Stahl
and Voigt 2004; Teerikangas and Very 2006). Culture
is a specific characteristic of organizations and may
differ considerably across firms (see Datta 1991). The
negative impact of cultural differences is thus expected
to be smaller for M&As within the same group of
companies (internal acquisition) than for external
acquisitions. However, we presume that, in sum, the
advantages of cultural similarity cannot compensate
for the smaller synergy potential of internal acquisi-
tions compared with external acquisitions.
H5: Internal acquisitions are less likely to generate a
positive M&A performance (innovation and economic
performance) than external acquisitions.
2.5 Internal versus external financing
According to the free cash flow theory (see, e.g.,
Jensen 1986), M&A performance and the method of
payment for the M&A should be strongly related.
Increased financial leverage for M&A activities
increases management’s focus on debt repayment
and cost reduction, and limits freedom to use future
cash flows. While increased efficiency should posi-
tively affect economic performance (see Sharma and
Ho 2002), increased focus on immediate cash flows
may reduce R&D intensity (see Long and Ravenscraft
1993; Cassiman et al. 2005; Bertrand 2009). We test
such effects by including a variable that measures
whether the M&A is mainly equity-financed.
H6: Equity-financed M&As show a higher eco-
nomic and innovation performance than debt-financed
M&As.
3 Description of the data
3.1 Construction of the dataset
The sample we use in this study refers to the cohort of
Swiss M&As that existed between 2006 and 2008.
This cohort was registered by the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office and originally contained 2,048 firms.
We checked in detail the original data in a multi-step
process. In a first step, the changes in the firm structure
of acquiring firms were verified using the information
of the Swiss Commercial Register. A further verifica-
tion whether these (legal) changes corresponded to
real M&A activities was attained through specific
questions in the questionnaire that was addressed to
the acquiring firms. A total of 413 firms of the original
sample were excluded because (1) the registered
M&As were only legal adaptations to already estab-
lished economic relations; (2) they were non-profit
organizations; and (3) they were firms with less than
one full-time employee. Further, 237 firms have
already left the market in 2011 and could not be
contacted anymore. After these adjustments 1,398
were left in the sample that corresponded to our
definition of M&A. We defined M&A as the partial or
full merger or acquisition of firms that are legally
independent from each other. This definition covers
both external M&As and M&As within the same
group of firms (internal M&As).
The data have been collected in the course of a
postal survey on the ‘‘M&A of the Swiss Economy’’
carried out in spring 2011. The available data are to a
high extent qualitative in nature (nominal or ordinal
measures). The part dealing with the characteristic of
the M&A is strongly inspired from the two surveys
used in Capron (1999) and Cassiman et al. (2005),
respectively. The survey yielded information on
general M&A characteristics (number of M&A per
acquiring firm, relative size, method of payment,
relatedness, etc.), the degree of integration of M&A,
motives for and obstacles to M&A, and the effect of
M&As on different performance measures. If more
than one transaction took place in the period
2006–2008 within the same firm, firms were asked to
make average statements. In addition, we collected
information on innovative activities and some basic
characteristics of the firm (sales, value added, employ-
ment, firm age, industry affiliation, etc.).1
The survey yielded data for 405 enterprises,
implying a response rate of 29 %. This is satisfactory
given the very demanding questionnaire and that not
all ‘wrong’ M&As could be identified in advance. Due
to missing values for some of the model variables,
1 The questionnaire is available in German and French on
www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/.
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only about 300 observations could be used for model
estimation. Table 1 presents information on the sam-
ple composition by sector, industry, and firm size
class.
3.2 Measurement of performance
3.2.1 Indicators
M&As are complex and multidimensional (see Meglio
and Risberg 2011). Accordingly, we use several
indicators to measure performance. Our measures of
M&A performance are based on self-reported data
(‘perceptual measures’). Self-reported data have been
extensively used in the literature, and also for
measuring the impact of M&A on performance (e.g.,
Datta 1991; Capron 1999; Cassiman et al. 2005; for an
overview, see Meglio and Risberg 2011). Self-
reported measures carry some methodological limita-
tions as they are qualitative and to some extent
subjective. However, self-reported data have some
important features, as ‘objective’ measures are
unlikely to allow the isolating of the impact of the
M&A from other exogenous variables (see Capron
1999; Cassiman et al. 2005). This is basically the case
for two reasons. Firstly, ‘objective’ measures such as
accounting data are typically available in aggregated
form only and do not allow the identification of the
effect of a specific transaction. Secondly, the time lag
of the impact of M&A is larger for ‘objective’
measures. Accordingly, it is hardly possible to identify
such effects 3–5 years after the transaction.
In the survey, 2–5 years after the M&A,2 firms were
asked to report on a five-level Likert scale the impact
of the M&A on six different performance measures
(‘‘How did the M&A affect the following measures:
(1) market share, (2) sales, (3) profitability, (4)
intensity of R&D expenditures, (5) number of patent
applications, and (6) share of sales of new products.’’).
While the questions (1) to (3) deal with economic
performance, questions (4) to (6) are proxies for
innovation performance.
3.2.2 Performance of M&As
Table 2 shows the firms’ responses for all six
measures. A (small) majority of acquiring firms
reported an increase of sales and/or market share as
a consequence of M&A (53 and 63 %, respectively.3
Only 2–3 % of the firms recorded a decrease. The rest
could not detect any impact (44 and 34 %, respec-
tively). The outcomes with respect to profitability are
slightly different. Almost 10 % of the firms reported a
decrease of profitability and about 45 % either no
change or an increase.
The situation is quite different with respect to
innovation performance (about 59 % of the acquiring
firms reported innovation activities in the period
2008–2010). For all three indicators (R&D expendi-
tures, patent applications and sales shares of new
products), the dominant result was that no effect could
be traced back to M&A (73–91 %). Less than 10 %
reported a decrease. Even fewer reported an increase,
with the notable exception of the indicator ‘sales share
of new products’.
Our questionnaire also includes information on the
development of objective measures (sales, value
added, innovation expenditures) after the M&A,
specifically for the period 2008–2010. In alternative
estimates not presented here, we compared the results
for objective and subjective measures. Given the
discussion above, it is no surprise that the impact of
M&A characteristics on the development of objective
measures was low. Thus, self-reported data seem to be
more appropriate to analyze the impact of M&As on
performance in our case.
3.3 Characteristics of the M&As
As we have seen in the previous section, our sample of
M&As seems to be representative for the entire
population of Swiss M&As in the period 2006–2008.
Accordingly, the characteristics of these M&As
2 The M&A took place in the period 2006–2008, our survey at
the beginning of 2011 and was referring to firm activities until
the end of 2010. Given that M&As were (almost) equally
distributed in the period 2006–2008, the assessments of the
impact of M&As refer on average to about 3.5 years after M&A.
We assume that 3.5 years would be sufficient adaptation time
for SMEs.
3 One may argue that a simple addition of the sales (or market
shares) of the acquiring and the acquired firm would always lead
to an increase of the sales (or market share) from the point of
view of the acquiring firm, even without any synergy effects. Of
course we cannot exclude this case. But the findings do not seem
to show in this direction: a significant share of the acquiring
firms reported no impact or even decrease (market share: 46 %;
sales: 36 %; see Table 2). Similar considerations apply also to
the indicators for innovation performance.
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should tell us something about how average M&As
look like. Detailed descriptions of the collected data
are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
Most of the M&As took place in the service sector
(65 %), 27 % in the manufacturing sector, the remain-
ing 8 % in the construction sector. In the service sector
as well as in the manufacturing sector, M&As were
equally distributed among sub-sectors (high-tech vs.
low-tech; knowledge-intensive vs. traditional ser-
vices). M&As were also equally distributed among
industries. Only the industries ‘wholesale’, ‘banks,
insurance’ and ‘business services’ had a share of more
than 10 % of the total sample.
The acquiring firms were for the most part small
firms: 60 % of the firms had fewer than 100 employees
and only 14 % of the firms employed more than 500
employees. The relative size of the target to acquirer
was mostly small. The sales of the target firm made
less than 5 % of the acquirer’s sales in nearly 30 % of
all M&As. The target firm was larger than the
acquiring firm in only 1 % of all transactions.
Most of the targets have been totally integrated in
the existing firm after the acquisition (89 %). Further-
more, most acquisitions referred to firms with some
degree of relatedness: 59 % had substitutive technol-
ogies, 35 % complementary technologies, 39 % were
market-related, and 54 % even belonged to the same
group of companies.
M&As were mostly motivated by growth- and cost-
related objectives. The most important motive was the
objective to increase the market share (61 %), fol-
lowed by the motives to obtain access to networks
(44 %), spread fixed costs (43 %), and entry into new
businesses (42 %). Innovation-related motives were
for most firms of minor importance. This may partially
be explained by the fact that most firms in our sample
are quite small and innovation activities are of small
Table 1 Sample composition by sector, industry and firm size
n Percentage
Industry/sector
Manufacturing 106 27
High-tech manufacturing 51 13
Low-tech manufacturing 55 14
Food, beverage, tobacco 9 2
Textiles 3 1
Clothing, leather 0 0
Wood processing 3 1
Paper 3 1
Printing 16 4
Chemicals 8 2
Plastics, rubber 2 1
Glass, stone, clay 4 1
Metal 0 0
Metalworking 9 2
Machinery 23 6
Electrical machinery 6 2
Electronics, instruments 8 2
Watches 3 1
Vehicles 4 1
Other manufacturing 3 1
Energy 2 1
Construction 30 8
Services 257 65
Modern services 129 33
Traditional services 128 32
Wholesale trade 57 15
Retail trade 18 5
Hotels, catering 7 2
Transport, telecommunication 24 6
Banks, insurance 60 15
Real estate, leasing, computer services 14 4
Computer services 21 5
Business services 44 11
Personal services 2 1
Education 2 1
Health, veterinary and social work 0 0
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation
and similar activities
2 1
Recreational, cultural and sporting
activities
6 2
Total 393 100
Firm size
1–9 employees 53 13
10–19 employees 32 8
Table 1 continued
n Percentage
20–49 employees 88 22
50–99 employees 66 16
100–499 employees 106 26
500 and more employees 58 14
Total 403 100
Firm size information is based on information for the year 2010.
Due to different response rates, the number of observations
differs between variables
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importance. However, the importance of innovation
objectives does not increase significantly, when we
observe only firms with R&D activities.
Most M&As were only marginally affected by the
obstacles listed in our survey. The most important
obstacles were limited management capacities (14 %),
linguistic/cultural differences (10 %), and the (unfa-
vorable) development of the market demand (10 %).
4 Econometric framework
4.1 Dependent variable
As mentioned in Sect. 3.2, our dataset includes
information on different indicators of economic as
well as innovation performance of M&As. With
respect to economic performance, we have informa-
tion on the impact on (1) market share, (2) sales, and
(3) profitability. Effects with respect to the innovation
performance are measured by the impact on (1) R&D
intensity, (2) the number of patent applications, and
(3) the share of sales of new products.
The impact of M&As on all six performance
measures has been assessed by the firms on a five-
point Likert scale (1: ‘strong decrease’; 5: ‘strong
increase’). To be able to investigate the impact of both
dimensions of performance as a whole, we calculated
overall measures for both types of performance. In
order to test the robustness of the overall dependent
variables, we constructed two alternative measures for
economic performance and two alternative measures
for innovation performance. The exact construction of
these measures is described in Table 4. All con-
structed measures were binary variables.4 We esti-
mated our model for economic performance and
innovation performance separately for both versions
of the overall variable, as well as for each of the single
measures for economic and innovation performance.
To explain M&A performance, we took into
consideration all the determinants discussed in Sect.
2. We use the same specification for both performance
variables. To take into account the binary character of
the dependent variables, we estimate probit models.
4.2 Specification of the empirical model
4.2.1 Basic model
Our specification concept is based on the framework
of an expanded production function. The model
contains the indirect measures of (possible) M&A
synergies (relative size; total integration; substitutive
technologies; complementary technologies; market
related; internal acquisition; for a detailed definition
of the variables and descriptive statistics, see Tables 4,
8, respectively) that refer to the hypotheses H1–H5.
We test H6 using the variable (equity-financed).
Furthermore, we include a variable that would
capture effects on M&A performance that are not
directly related to synergy effects. The M&A perfor-
mance may depend on the point of time, on which it is
measured (see Meglio and Risberg 2011). As the point
in time varies in our sample, a variable controls for the
point in time the M&A took place (integration date).
Our model also contains controls for market
conditions (demand development; price and non-price
competition), innovation activities (only for economic
performance), human resources, capital input and
independency of the firm. Furthermore, we controlled
for firm size (size) and sector affiliation (sector
affiliation).
Table 2 Descriptive information on M&A performance
Percentage
decrease
Percentage
no impact
Percentage
increase
M&A performance: share of firms with a certain assessment of
the impact of the M&A on a specific performance measure
Economic performance
Market share 2 44 53
Sales 3 34 63
Profitability 9 45 46
Innovation performance
Intensity of R&D
expenditures
8 87 5
Number of patent
applications
7 91 3
Share of sales of
new products
6 73 21
4 We have also tested alternative dependent variables that allow
distinguishing different levels of performance effects (ordinal
overall variables). However, the respective ordered probit
estimates differ only marginally from the probit estimates based
on the binary variables and yielded no additional insights.
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Table 3 Descriptive information on M&A characteristics
Percentage of firms
Relative size of target to acquirer (in % of annual sales)
B5 29
6–25 37
26–50 24
51–100 8
[100 1
Total 100
Integration and relatedness
Total integration of the target firm in the existing firm 89
The target and the acquiring firm operated in the same market (same industry, product and market) 39
The target and the acquiring firm had substitutive technologies 59
The target and the acquiring firm had complementary technologies 35
The target and the acquiring firm belonged to the same group of companies 54
Motives: share of firms assessing a specific objective as important (value 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale) for M&A
Growth
Increase market share in the existing business of the acquiring firm 61
Broaden the product mix of the existing business of the acquiring firm 31
Entry into businesses that were new to the acquirer 42
Costs
Spread fixed costs of production over larger output 43
Rationalization of procurement 31
Rationalization of production 27
Rationalization of marketing and sales 37
Resources
Obtain access to specific know-how in production 25
Obtain access to specific know-how in distribution 22
Obtain access to networks (customers, supplier) 44
Risks
Spread the market risk 24
Innovation
Reduce costs of R&D 7
Obtain access to innovation related know-how 15
Obtain access to innovation related networks (e.g., universities) 6
Reduce the risks of the R&D portfolio 5
Reduce the risk of being imitated 7
Get competing technologies under control 8
Obstacles: share of firms assessing a specific obstacle as important (value 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale)
Distance
Large geographical distance 5
Linguistic/cultural differences 10
Lack of synergies 7
Coordination
Insufficient management capacity 14
High costs of coordination 9
Inconsistent objectives 7
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4.2.2 Extended model
Besides the information on general M&A characteristics
and performance, our dataset also includes information
on motives for M&As and M&A-related obstacles. This
information was also exploited in our analysis.
The use of the motive variables as additional right-
hand variables in our model allows the investigation of
the degree of attainment of the objectives that firms
pursued with respect to M&A. Positive (negative)
correlations with the performance variables would
indicate that objectives and outcomes are (not)
congruent. Particularly, we expect that ‘cost-oriented’
motives correlate positively primarily with economic
performance, ‘innovation-oriented’ primarily with
innovation performance, and market-oriented motives
with both performance measures.
The use of the obstacle variables allows some
additional insights on the possible problems that might
explain weak performance outcomes. We expect
negative effects of these variables on both perfor-
mance measures.
The respective data refer to 17 single motives and 9
obstacles, respectively, the importance of which has
been assessed by the firms on a five-point Likert scale.
Using principal component factor analysis of the
single motives, we identified three groups of motives
(see Table 11 in the appendix for detailed information
on the individual motives and the factor matrix).
Factor 1 stands for innovation-oriented motives
(innovation motive). Factor 2 refers to market exten-
sion motives (market motive). Factor 3 represents cost
reduction motives (cost motive). The three ‘motive
variables’ extracted by factor analysis are added to the
explanatory variables of our basic model.
The same procedure was used for the obstacle
variables. Based on principal component factor anal-
ysis, we identified two groups of obstacles (see
Table 12). Factor 1 depicts organizational obstacles
(organizational obstacle) such as geographical dis-
tance, linguistical/cultural differences or inconsistent
objectives. Factor 2 captures financial constraints
(financial obstacle). Both factors are added to the
variables of our basic model.
The analysis is based on cross-sectional data (see
Sect. 3). Therefore, the potential problem of endoge-
neity cannot be solved. As a consequence, we have to
be cautious in interpreting the results. Hence, we
refrain from making causal claims, but rather interpret
the estimated coefficients as partial correlations.
Nevertheless, the coefficients show whether and to
what extent the results are in line with the hypotheses
postulated in Sect. 2.
Finally, as one can see in the correlation matrix in
Table 9 in the appendix, the results are also not driven
by multicollinearity.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Basic model
The cross-section character of our data does not allow a
causal interpretation of our results. Thus, we interpret
them as correlations, which would indicate a degree of
accordance with our hypotheses, if the estimated
effects show in the same direction as the hypotheses.
The results of the probit estimates are reported in
Tables 5 and 6.5 Columns 1–3 of Table 5 show the
results for the two versions of the overall variable of
Table 3 continued
Percentage of firms
Financing
Insufficient availability of internal capital 6
Insufficient availability of external capital 6
Market
Development of the market demand 10
5 We also estimated a bivariate model for economic perfor-
mance (after dropping the variable ‘‘innovation activities’’) and
innovation performance in order to capture the effects of
interdependence between these variables possibly driven by
some unobserved heterogeneity, as a referee suggested. The
results were practically the same as in the separate probit
estimates presented in Table 5 so we refrain from presenting
them here.
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Table 4 Variable definition and measurement
Variable Definition/measurement
Dependent variables
Economic performance I Measure I is a binary variables takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of performance
(due to M&A) for one of the three single performance indicators (values 4 or 5 on a five-
level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’; see below), and 0 otherwise
Economic performance II Measure II is a binary variable, which is constructed as follows: based on the average of the
scores of the three single performance indicators (five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong
decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’; see below) this binary variable takes the value 1 if the
average score is equal or higher than 4 (increase or strong increase), and 0 otherwise
Market share Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of market share due to
M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’)
Sales Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of sales due to M&A
(values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’)
Profitability Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of profitability due to
M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’)
Innovation performance I Measure I is a binary variables takes the value 1 if a firm reports a positive increase of
overall innovation performance due to M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—
1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’) for one of the three single innovation indicators
(see below), and 0 otherwise
Innovation performance II Measure II is a binary variable, which is constructed as follows: based on the average of the
scores of the three single innovation indicators (five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong
decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’; see below) this binary variable takes the value 1 if the
average score is equal or higher than 4 (increase or strong increase), and 0 otherwise
R&D intensity Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of R&D intensity due to
M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5: ‘strong increase’)
Patent applications Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of the number of patent
applications due to M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease;
5: ‘strong increase’)
New product share Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase of shares of sales of new
products due to M&A (values 4 or 5 on a five-level Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease; 5:
‘strong increase’)
Independent variables
M&A synergy
Relative size Relative size of annual sales of target to acquirer; natural logarithm
Total integration Total integration of the target firm in the acquiring firm yes/no (reference group: partial or
no integration)
Substitutive technologies The target and the acquiring firm had related technologies yes/no
Complementary technologies The target and the acquiring firm had complementary technologies yes/no
Market related The target and the acquiring firm operated in the same market (same industry, product and
market) yes/no
Internal acquisition The target and the acquiring firm belonged to the same group of companies yes/no
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date Point in time when the transaction took place [differentiated by month; variable ranging
from 1 (January 2006) to 36 (December 2008)]
Equity financed M&A was mainly equity-financed yes/no
Control variables: based on information after M&A
Demand development Development of a firm’s specific product demand in the past 3 years (2008–2010): binary
variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an increase I demand (values 4 or 5 on a
five-point Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease’; 5: ‘strong increase’), and 0 otherwise
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economic performance, and columns 4–6 the esti-
mates for the three single indicators of economic
performance. Table 6, which presents the results for
the innovation equation, is similarly structured.
The relative size of target to acquirer is positively
correlated with economic as well as innovation
performance of M&As. Thus, hypothesis H1 cannot
be rejected. Furthermore, in line with hypothesis H2,
we find that the full integration of the target firm in the
existing firms does positively correlate with both
M&A performance measures.
Most other studies report similar results. A positive
effect of relative size of the acquired firm on the long-term
performance was also found by Dutta and Jog (2009)
based on data for 1,300 Canadian M&As in the period
1993–2002. In an earlier study based on 253 M&As of
large European and US firms in the period 1988–1992,
Capron (1999) also found positive effects of relative size
on measures of both economic and innovation perfor-
mance. No such effect was found by Sharma and Ho
(2002) in a study based on a sample of 36 Australian
M&As in the period 1986–1991, or by Datta (1991) in a
study of 173 US manufacturing firms in the period
1980–1984.
Rather unexpectedly, the effect of market-related-
ness on economic performance is positive but not
statistically significant. Also, the coefficients of the
two variables for technology-relatedness are not
significant in the equations for economic performance.
The underlying reasoning of hypothesis H3 is that
unrelated M&As face larger obstacles as they are not
familiar with each other’s businesses. In the case of
economic performance, such obstacles should in a first
step affect production costs, and only in the long run
affect other performance measures. Accordingly, we
would expect that relatedness does primarily affect a
firm’s profitability and not the development of the
market share and sales. Some supportive evidence for
this argumentation can be found at least for market-
relatedness. In estimates of the model separately for
the individual performance indicators, we find that
market-relatedness is significantly positive correlated
with profitability (column 6 in Table 5). For the other
performance indicators, no significant effect can be
observed. Thus, hypothesis H3 is partly rejected.
In line with hypothesis H4a, market-relatedness
shows a negative effect on the innovation performance
of the M&As. The realization of potential efficiency
Table 4 continued
Variable Definition/measurement
Price competition Intensity of price competition: binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an
increase I demand (values 4 or 5 on a five-point Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease’; 5:
‘strong increase’), and 0 otherwise
Non-price competition Intensity of non-price competition: binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports an
increase I demand (values 4 or 5 on a five-point Likert scale—1: ‘strong decrease’; 5:
‘strong increase’), and 0 otherwise
Investment intensity Gross investment per employee (2010), natural logarithm
Tertiary share Share of employees with a tertiary-level degree
Innovation activities Development and introduction of product innovation yes/no (2008–2010)
Independent Firm is not part of a group of companies yes/no
Firm size Number of employees (2010); natural logarithm
High tech manufacturing Binary variable for firms belonging to NACE 19, 20–22; 26–30
Low tech manufacturing Binary variable for firms belonging to NACE 10–18; 23, 24, 25, 31–33, 35–39
Modern services Binary variable for firms belonging to NACE 53, 61, 58–60; 62, 63, 64–66; 69–74; 78, 80,
82
Traditional services Binary variable for firms belonging to NACE 45–47; 95 49–52; 79, 55, 56, 68, 77, 81, 96
Motives
Innovation motive; market motive;
cost motive
Factor scores of motives for M&As (see Table 12 in the appendix)
Obstacles
Proximity organizational obstacle;
financial obstacle
Factor scores of obstacles (see Table 12 in the appendix)
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Table 5 Probit estimates of economic M&A performance; basic model (average marginal effects)
Dependent variable Economic
performance I
Economic
performance II
Economic
performance II
Market
share
Sales Profitability
M&A synergy
Relative size 0.086***
(0.017)
0.097***
(0.017)
0.098***
(0.017)
0.095***
(0.018)
0.100***
(0.018)
0.074***
(0.022)
Total integration 0.148**
(0.063)
0.172**
(0.068)
0.172**
(0.069)
0.259***
(0.077)
0.168**
(0.074)
0.056
(0.087)
Substitutive technologies 0.054
(0.047)
0.045
(0.052)
0.034
(0.052)
-0.020
(0.054)
0.064
(0.053)
-0.056
(0.061)
Complementary technologies 0.027
(0.050)
-0.013
(0.052)
0.004
(0.052)
-0.029
(0.055)
0.030
(0.054)
0.057
(0.059)
Market related -0.034
(0.050)
0.005
(0.056)
0.000
(0.056)
0.097
(0.058)
-0.081
(0.057)
0.131**
(0.064)
Internal acquisition -0.175***
(0.046)
-0.158***
(0.048)
-0.163***
(0.048)
-0.275***
(0.047)
-0.251***
(0.048)
-0.029
(0.057)
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date -0.002
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
Equity financed 0.071
(0.065)
0.052
(0.069)
0.046
(0.072)
0.063
(0.073)
0.196***
(0.067)
0.114
(0.082)
Control variables
Demand development 0.085*
(0.046)
0.059
(0.049)
0.088*
(0.047)
0.125**
(0.050)
0.147***
(0.049)
-0.026
(0.058)
Price competition 0.018
(0.045)
0.066
(0.048)
0.067
(0.048)
0.076
(0.051)
0.061
(0.049)
0.008
(0.058)
Non price competition -0.025
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.046)
-0.017
(0.046)
-0.045
(0.048)
-0.033
(0.047)
-0.019
(0.055)
Investment intensity 0.010
(0.009)
0.007
(0.009)
0.008
(0.010)
0.002
(0.010)
0.018*
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.013)
Tertiary share -0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
Innovation activities 0.110**
(0.048)
0.128**
(0.051)
0.094*
(0.052)
0.099*
(0.051)
0.087
(0.060)
Independent 0.097**
(0.043)
0.080*
(0.046)
0.087*
(0.046)
0.120**
(0.047)
0.068
(0.047)
0.028
(0.055)
Firm size 0.011
(0.013)
0.013
(0.014)
0.022
(0.014)
0.021
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.015)
0.010
(0.017)
High tech manufacturing 0.001
(0.104)
-0.112
(0.112)
-0.019
(0.104)
-0.112
(0.120)
0.033
(0.114)
0.039
(0.136)
Low tech manufacturing -0.011
(0.097)
-0.069
(0.105)
-0.016
(0.102)
-0.053
(0.112)
0.028
(0.108)
0.078
(0.124)
Modern services 0.052
(0.085)
-0.012
(0.094)
0.038
(0.092)
0.025
(0.103)
0.046
(0.097)
0.062
(0.114)
Traditional services 0.067
(0.086)
-0.013
(0.096)
0.039
(0.092)
0.004
(0.102)
0.152
(0.096)
0.136
(0.113)
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gains seems to distract firms from innovation activi-
ties. Additional evidence from the estimates for the
single indicators shows that the negative effect of the
market-relatedness can be traced back to the sales
share of new products (column 5 in Table 6).
The coefficient of the variable for complementary
technology-relatedness is positive but not statistically
significant, that of the variable for substitutive tech-
nology-relatedness is negative and statistically signif-
icant. Thus, hypothesis H4b is partly rejected. The
negative effect of substitutive technology-relatedness
is related primarily with the single indicators number
of patent applications and sales share of new products
(columns 4 and 5 in Table 6).
The evidence from similar studies is mixed. Capron
(1999), Sharma and Ho (2002), and Dutta and Jog
(2009) found no effect of (market-)relatedness on the
economic performance of M&As. An older study by
Singh and Montgomery (1987) based on 105 US firms in
the period 1975–1980 found a positive effect of market-
relatedness on the profitability of M&As. Cassiman
et al. (2005) reported a negative effect of market-
relatedness, a positive effect of complementary tech-
nology-relatedness, and a negative effect of substitutive
technology-relatedness on innovation performance.
However, their statistical base of the data of 31 firms
is rather narrow. In this sense, our results provide
evidence in favor of H4 on a considerably broader basis.
The economic M&A performance is negatively
related to internal acquisitions (primarily associated with
the single indicators market share and sales; columns 4
and 5 in Table 5). The effect on innovation performance
is not statistically significant. A possible explanation may
be that the realization of synergies in innovation requires
a higher level of integration and that just belonging to the
same group of companies is not sufficient to realize
synergies in innovation. Accordingly, in the case of
internal acquisitions, more synergy potential might be
available with respect to innovation performance than
with respect to economic performance. Hypothesis H5
cannot be rejected for economic performance, but is
rejected for innovation performance.
The variable for equity-financing of M&As shows, in
the equation for economic performance, the expected
positive sign, but the respective marginal effect is
statistically insignificant. However, a significantly
positive effect is found for sales (column 5 in Table 5).
Seemingly contrary to our expectations (H6), we find a
negative correlation of equity-financed M&A with the
measure for innovation performance, primarily stem-
ming from the indicator sales share of new products
(column 5 in Table 6). This means that firms that report
a high innovation performance due to M&A at the same
time report that the M&A was externally financed. A
more detailed analysis showed that this effect can be
traced back primarily (but not exclusively) to larger
firms, which in general have an easier access to external
finance (see Table 10 in the appendix). Thus, a possible
ex-post explanation could be that larger firms that have
good access to external financing may be able to finance
externally not only M&A but also innovation projects.
In this sense, this finding indicates to a limited validity of
H6. Furthermore, Weitzel and McCarthy (2011) argue,
and also show empirically, that in general SMEs use
more stock (external financing) and less cash as means
of payment than larger firms. This could be an
alternative explanation of our result, if we assume that
many firms understand under external financing not
only bank debt but also equity.
In general, one would expect that the process of
acquisition needs some time. Accordingly, the time
since acquisition and the judgement of the M&A
performance should be positively correlated. How-
ever, in our data, we cannot observe such an effect.
The point of time of M&A affects neither economic
nor innovation performance.
The M&A performance is only marginally affected
by market conditions and general firm characteristics
Table 5 continued
Dependent variable Economic
performance I
Economic
performance II
Economic
performance II
Market
share
Sales Profitability
N 322 318 319 320 322 320
Wald chi2 53.36*** 50.83*** 49.63*** 83.03*** 70.05*** 28.15
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.08
See Table 4 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test levels, respectively
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Table 6 Probit estimates of innovation M&A performance; basic model (average marginal effects)
Dependent variable Innovation
performance I
Innovation
performance II
R&D
intensity
Patent
applications
New product
share
M&A synergy
Relative size 0.078***
(0.017)
0.062***
(0.016)
0.006
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
0.078***
(0.017)
Total integration 0.147**
(0.072)
0.184**
(0.070)
0.038
(0.026)
0.147**
(0.069)
Substitutive technologies -0.118**
(0.049)
-0.125***
(0.046)
-0.041
(0.029)
-0.027**
(0.015)
-0.100**
(0.048)
Complementary technologies 0.045
(0.049)
0.058
(0.046)
0.042
(0.029)
-0.036*
(0.021)
0.032
(0.046)
Market related -0.099*
(0.055)
-0.119**
(0.053)
-0.014
(0.033)
-0.001
(0.019)
-0.110**
(0.053)
Internal acquisition -0.053
(0.049)
-0.037
(0.046)
0.013
(0.028)
0.005
(0.018)
-0.075
(0.046)
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date -0.002
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.002)
Equity financed -0.240***
(0.059)
-0.217***
(0.056)
0.054
(0.045)
-0.024
(0.021)
-0.226***
(0.055)
Control variables
Demand development 0.086*
(0.049)
0.032
(0.045)
0.032
(0.027)
-0.002
(0.016)
0.120***
(0.045)
Price competition 0.021
(0.046)
0.011
(0.044)
0.016
(0.028)
-0.009
(0.016)
0.008
(0.044)
Non price competition -0.027
(0.045)
-0.039
(0.042)
0.015
(0.027)
-0.018
(0.018)
0.012
(0.041)
Investment intensity 0.003
(0.010)
0.003
(0.009)
0.016***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.005
(0.009)
Tertiary share 0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.001)
Independent 0.004
(0.045)
0.031
(0.043)
-0.033
(0.030)
0.016
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.042)
Firm size 0.020
(0.014)
0.009
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.012*
(0.007)
0.013
(0.013)
High tech manufacturing 1.358***
(0.114)
1.222***
(0.111)
0.508***
(0.098)
0.247***
(0.072)
1.217***
(0.112)
Low tech manufacturing 1.167***
(0.113)
1.040***
(0.111)
0.369***
(0.087)
0.211***
(0.065)
1.032***
(0.111)
Modern services 1.173***
(0.111)
1.046***
(0.108)
0.400***
(0.084)
0.173***
(0.056)
1.028***
(0.105)
Traditional services 1.214***
(0.106)
1.021***
(0.103)
0.410***
(0.083)
0.200***
(0.062)
1.065***
(0.103)
N 300 295 260 296 302
Wald chi2 1218.32*** 816.94*** 702.49*** 381.84*** 1036.11***
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such as capital intensity and human capital intensity.
Only a few of the control variables have a statistically
significant effect on the M&A performance. Demand
development, innovation activities (only included in
the economic performance equation), and indepen-
dency of the firm are the three exceptions with respect
to the estimates for economic performance. These
variables correlate positively with economic M&A
performance. Demand development is also positively
correlated with the innovation variable (column 5 in
Table 6) and investment intensity with R&D intensity
(column 3 in Table 6).
Finally, we also examined possible size effects, for
example differences between small (less than 50
employees) and medium-sized and large firms (50
employees and more) in our sample. To this end, we
estimated the economic performance and the innova-
tion equation separately for small and medium-sized
and large firms (Table 10 in the appendix). With
respect to economic performance, these results yield
some additional insights. The effect of full integration
is stronger for small firms. Firm independence and
innovation activities are more important for larger
firms. Non-price competition seems to be positively
correlated with economic performance for small firms
but negatively for larger ones. Such a difference may
indicate different market environments of small and
larger firms. With respect to innovation, the effects for
substitutive and complementary effects of technology-
relatedness that were found for all firms can be clearly
traced back to larger firms. On the contrary, the
difference as to effect of internal and external
acquisitions is more relevant for small firms, similarly
to the full integration effect for economic performance
already mentioned above.
5.2 Extended model
Estimation results for the model extension are pre-
sented in Table 7. The inclusion of additional variables
for motives and obstacles does not affect the results of
the basic variables. We find that innovation perfor-
mance is positively correlated with innovation-specific
and market-specific motives, economic performance
with market- and cost-related motives. The effect of
market-specific motives on economic performance is
larger than the effect on innovation performance.
Only the variable for lack of proximity and
organizational obstacles, a factor that is often consid-
ered as a main determinant of M&A failure, shows the
expected negative effect on economic performance.
Neither types of obstacles show any effect on inno-
vation performance.
6 Summary and conclusions
Firms from the service sector were involved in about
65 % of the M&As that existed in Switzerland in the
period 2006–2008, with 8 % construction firms and
about 27 % manufacturing firms. About 86 % of the
acquiring firms had less than 500 employees, and
60 % of them even fewer than 100 employees. For
one-third of the acquiring firms, the acquired entity
amounted to 25–100 % of their size as measured by
annual sales. For the other two-thirds, the relative size
of the acquired firms was less than 25 %. In only 5
cases (about 1 % of all M&As), the acquired entity
was larger than the acquiring firm.
Most of the acquiring firms reported an increase of
sales and/or market share as a consequence of M&A
(53 and 63 %, respectively). Only 2–3 % of the firms
recorded a decrease and the rest could not detect any
impact (44 and 34 %, respectively). The outcomes
with respect to profitability are slightly different.
Almost 10 % of the firms reported a decrease of
profitability and about 45 % either no change or an
increase. The situation is quite different with respect to
innovation performance. For all three innovation
indicators, the dominant result was that no effect
Table 6 continued
Dependent variable Innovation
performance I
Innovation
performance II
R&D
intensity
Patent
applications
New product
share
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22
See Table 4 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients; the variable total integration is not
included in the R&D model as it predicts the failure perfectly
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test levels, respectively
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could be traced back to M&A (73–91 %). Less than
10 % reported a decrease but even fewer an increase,
with the exception of ‘‘sales share of new products’’.
Based on the firms’ own assessments of six
indicators of economic and innovation performance
effects of the M&As, we investigated the factors that
appear to correlate with high M&A performance. To
this end, the performance measures are regressed on a
series of possible determining factors as postulated in
existing theoretical and empirical literature.
M&A performance is primarily affected by specific
M&A characteristics, but not by general market
characteristics such as demand development or com-
petition conditions. Rather astonishingly, it is also not
affected by firm characteristics such as capital inten-
sity, human capital endowment, and firm size. There is
an interesting exception: innovation activities. This
means that, with the remarkable exception of innova-
tion activities, the level of M&A performance is
determined primarily by factors of the M&A process
itself.
Table 7 Probit estimates of M&A performance; model
extension including motives and obstacles (average marginal
effects)
Dependent variable Economic
performance II
Innovation
performance II
M&A synergy
Relative size 0.075***
(0.018)
0.046***
(0.017)
Total integration 0.120*
(0.067)
0.201***
(0.075)
Substitutive technologies 0.005
(0.052)
-0.116**
(0.046)
Complementary technologies -0.032
(0.051)
0.039
(0.046)
Market related 0.007
(0.056)
-0.108**
(0.053)
Internal acquisition -0.133**
(0.051)
0.001
(0.050)
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date 0.001
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.002)
Equity financed 0.054
(0.071)
-0.195***
(0.056)
Control variables
Demand development 0.058
(0.048)
0.041
(0.044)
Price competition 0.056
(0.047)
-0.001
(0.043)
Non price competition -0.024
(0.045)
-0.022
(0.041)
Investment intensity 0.003
(0.009)
0.002
(0.009)
Tertiary share 0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
Innovation activities 0.137***
(0.049)
Independent 0.051
(0.045)
0.042
(0.043)
Firm size 0.012
(0.014)
0.006
(0.015)
High tech manufacturing -0.121
(0.105)
1.126***
(0.105)
Low tech manufacturing -0.100
(0.095)
0.980***
(0.105)
Modern services -0.011
(0.087)
0.985***
(0.100)
Table 7 continued
Dependent variable Economic
performance II
Innovation
performance II
Traditional services -0.046
(0.088)
0.961***
(0.101)
Motives
Innovation motive -0.009
(0.025)
0.064***
(0.019)
Market motive 0.073***
(0.026)
0.051**
(0.024)
Cost motive 0.098***
(0.024)
-0.005
(0.023)
Obstacles
Proximity organizational
obstacle
-0.044*
(0.026)
0.018
(0.022)
Financial obstacle -0.007
(0.021)
0.010
(0.021)
N 310 289
Wald chi2 80.92*** 931.10***
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.26
See Table 4 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in
parentheses under the coefficients
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test levels,
respectively
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Both performance measures correlate positively
with relative size. The larger the acquired entity, the
larger is the synergy potential that can be exploited
and, according to the firms’ assessment, had been
effectively exploited. A further condition that enables
the acquiring firm to benefit from the synergy potential
of M&A is a high degree of integration of the acquired
firm in the new structure. A further important factor is
the relatedness of acquiring and acquired entity with
respect (1) to products and (2) to innovation activities.
Internal acquisitions appear to have a significantly
lower synergy potential than external acquisitions
with respect to economic performance. Market-relat-
edness matters, negatively as expected, only for
innovative performance. Also, technology-relatedness
is an issue only for innovation performance. In this
case, we found the same effect as Cassiman et al.
(2005), namely that substitutive technologies do not
enhance innovation performance. There is also a
positive effect of complementary technologies, but it
is not statistically significant.
Contrary to theoretical expectations, equity-
financed M&As do not show a superior economic
performance to debt-financed ones; they even seem to
be less innovative than debt-financed M&As.
Deeper insights in the differing characteristics of
successful and unsuccessful M&As could be gained by
a comparison of firms involved in M&As and firms
that are not involved in M&As. To this end, a large
sample of control firms is needed. This is a task that is
to be pursued in the next future.
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics based on ‘basic model’
Model Economic performance Innovation performance
n = 318 n = 295
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Dependent variables
Economic performance Binary 0.708 0.455
Innovation performance Binary 0.210 0.408
Independent variables
M&A synergy
Relative size Continuous 2.498 1.329 2.489 1.331
Total integration Binary 0.875 0.332 0.871 0.336
Substitutive technologies Binary 0.586 0.493 0.583 0.494
Complementary technologies Binary 0.357 0.480 0.359 0.481
Market related Binary 0.389 0.488 0.383 0.487
Internal acquisition Binary 0.524 0.500 0.525 0.500
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date Continuous 20.284 9.275 20.211 9.269
Equity financed Binary 0.868 0.339 0.881 0.324
Control variables
Demand development Binary 0.398 0.490 0.400 0.491
Price competition Binary 0.643 0.480 0.637 0.482
Non-price competition Binary 0.404 0.492 0.400 0.491
Investment intensity Continuous 8.681 2.276 8.683 2.279
Tertiary share Continuous 32.189 28.290 33.049 28.714
Innovation activities Binary 0.503 0.501
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Table 9 Correlation matrix (based on ‘basic model’ of the economic performance equation; n = 318)
Relative
size
Total
integration
Substitutive
technologies
Complementary
technologies
Market
related
Internal
acquisition
Total integration 0.068
Substitutive
technologies
0.124 0.077
Complementary
technologies
-0.017 0.097 0.248
Market related 0.189 0.122 0.394 0.242
Internal acquisition 0.011 0.220 0.087 0.153 0.128
Integration date 0.117 -0.021 0.009 0.014 -0.123 -0.020
Equity financed -0.115 0.081 -0.043 -0.021 -0.012 0.168
Demand development -0.009 0.107 0.038 0.070 0.077 0.101
Price competition 0.001 0.040 0.067 0.034 0.114 -0.041
Non-price competition 0.035 0.036 0.028 0.016 0.049 0.042
Investment intensity -0.032 -0.037 0.114 0.033 0.198 -0.061
Tertiary share -0.034 0.043 -0.141 0.039 -0.096 0.097
Innovation activities -0.099 -0.065 -0.065 0.068 -0.095 -0.076
Independent -0.075 -0.043 -0.020 0.018 -0.019 -0.050
Firm size -0.261 -0.209 0.107 0.009 -0.116 -0.236
High tech
manufacturing
-0.016 -0.065 0.001 -0.017 -0.102 0.048
Low tech
manufacturing
0.042 -0.119 -0.001 -0.025 -0.054 -0.110
Modern services -0.025 0.052 0.028 0.095 0.100 0.060
Traditional services 0.056 0.041 -0.099 -0.107 0.009 -0.036
Integration
date
Equity
financed
Demand
development
Price
competition
Non price
competition
Investment
intensity
Equity financed -0.076
Demand development -0.075 0.088
Price competition 0.008 -0.021 -0.065
Non-price competition -0.089 0.020 -0.041 -0.037
Investment intensity 0.046 -0.055 0.119 -0.025 -0.047
Tertiary share 0.082 -0.020 -0.071 -0.143 0.018 -0.046
Innovation activities 0.004 -0.072 0.124 -0.022 0.065 0.099
Table 8 continued
Model Economic performance Innovation performance
n = 318 n = 295
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Independent Binary 0.433 0.496 0.420 0.494
Firm size Continuous 4.273 1.813 4.260 1.823
High tech manufacturing Binary 0.122 0.328 0.129 0.336
Low tech manufacturing Binary 0.144 0.352 0.156 0.363
Modern services Binary 0.323 0.468 0.325 0.469
Traditional services Binary 0.332 0.472 0.322 0.468
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Table 10 Probit estimates of M&A performance for different size classes; basic model (average marginal effects)
Dependent variable Economic performance II Innovation performance II
Size class Small Medium/large Small Medium/large
M&A synergy
Relative size 0.104***
(0.023)
0.102***
(0.025)
0.095***
(0.024)
0.042*
(0.024)
Total integration 0.449***
(0.102)
0.094
(0.081)
0.126
(0.138)
0.247***
(0.091)
Substitutive technologies 0.069
(0.087)
0.015
(0.064)
0.081
(0.074)
-0.196***
(0.053)
Complementary
technologies
0.020
(0.080)
-0.041
(0.065)
-0.018
(0.071)
0.113**
(0.055)
Market related -0.014
(0.084)
-0.008
(0.073)
-0.184**
(0.074)
-0.114*
(0.067)
Internal acquisition -0.232***
(0.076)
-0.127**
(0.062)
-0.103*
(0.061)
-0.022
(0.060)
Other M&A characteristics
Integration date -0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
Equity financed 0.023
(0.095)
0.056
(0.091)
-0.164*
(0.077)
-0.298***
(0.076)
Control variables
Demand development -0.002
(0.069)
0.096
(0.063)
-0.059
(0.070)
0.067
(0.056)
Table 9 continued
Integration
date
Equity
financed
Demand
development
Price
competition
Non price
competition
Investment
intensity
Independent 0.019 0.002 0.009 -0.091 -0.007 0.059
Firm size -0.034 0.023 -0.042 0.094 -0.031 0.153
High tech manufacturing -0.058 0.061 -0.087 -0.020 0.043 -0.010
Low tech manufacturing 0.000 -0.077 -0.004 0.028 0.006 0.069
Modern services -0.053 -0.030 -0.006 -0.076 -0.005 -0.052
Traditional services 0.143 -0.020 -0.014 0.028 -0.027 0.015
Tertiary
share
Innovation
activities
Independent Firm
size
High tech
manufacturing
Low tech
manufacturing
Modern
services
Innovation activities 0.107
Independent -0.096 0.052
Firm size -0.170 0.233 0.148
High tech manufacturing -0.009 0.237 0.004 0.075
Low tech manufacturing -0.159 0.033 0.039 0.123 -0.154
Modern services 0.334 -0.031 0.001 -0.050 -0.257 -0.283
Traditional services -0.124 -0.031 -0.036 -0.123 -0.264 -0.291 -0.486
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Table 11 Principal components factor analysis of motives for M&A (rotated factor loadings; pattern matrix); significant results in
bold
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Motive
Increase market share in the existing business of the acquiring firm 0.12 0.75 0.16
Broaden the product mix of the existing business of the acquiring firm 0.38 0.61 -0.03
Entry into businesses that were new to the acquirer 0.08 0.77 0.06
Spread fixed costs of production over larger output 0.10 0.01 0.80
Rationalization of procurement 0.24 0.22 0.79
Rationalization of production 0.21 -0.00 0.76
Rationalization of marketing and sales 0.16 0.23 0.74
Obtain access to specific know-how in production 0.59 0.37 0.20
Obtain access to specific know-how in distribution 0.45 0.50 0.28
Table 10 continued
Dependent variable Economic performance II Innovation performance II
Size class Small Medium/large Small Medium/large
Price competition 0.101
(0.072)
0.049
(0.063)
-0.065
(0.059)
0.048
(0.056)
Non price competition 0.143*
(0.073)
-0.123**
(0.057)
-0.062
(0.061)
-0.010
(0.055)
Investment intensity 0.016
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.017)
0.006
(0.009)
0.003
(0.016)
Tertiary share -0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
Innovation activities 0.068
(0.074)
0.119*
(0.069)
Independent 0.063
(0.070)
0.117*
(0.060)
0.060
(0.063)
-0.005
(0.054)
Firm size 0.026
(0.033)
0.025
(0.028)
-0.038
(0.031)
-0.014
(0.028)
High tech manufacturing -0.003
(0.179)
-0.139
(0.140)
1.123***
(0.177)
1.151***
(0.137)
Low tech manufacturing 0.036
(0.143)
-0.104
(0.133)
1.012***
(0.169)
0.950***
(0.143)
Modern services 0.032
(0.124)
0.030
(0.129)
0.993***
(0.154)
0.873***
(0.136)
Traditional services 0.075
(0.123)
-0.019
(0.127)
0.928***
(0.150)
0.954***
(0.139)
N 130 188 121 174
Wald chi2 51.47*** 31.68** 520.30*** 656.10***
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.15 0.28 0.28
See Table 4 for the variable definitions; standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients; firms with 1–49 employees are
classified as small, firms with 50 or more employees as medium/large
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % test levels, respectively
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